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The economic world of the populus Romanus 
 
 
Both ancient and modern observers have often commented on how swiftly Rome rose from 
small Italian city-state to world empire. In the mid-second century BCE, the Greek writer 
Polybius devoted his life’s work to chronicling ‘how and by what form of government the 
Romans brought almost the entire inhabited world was brought into their sole power in less 
than fifty-three years’ (Polybius, Histories 1.1).1 In the next hundred years, Rome’s 
conquests would go even further, encompassing the entire Mediterranean and reaching well 
into the Near East. Polybius’ stated interests are the diplomatic and military activity of the 
Romans (‘how’) and the political system that lay behind them, and he carries through this 
scheme in the multi-volume history that follows, describing Rome’s overseas activities and 
internal politics and including a long section with a thorough analysis of Rome’s 
governmental and military institutions and culture (Histories 6). In this programmatic 
statement he does not mention economic aspects of imperialism, and only rarely dwells on 
them in his wider narrative.2 To scholars of ancient history, this comes as no surprise: it is a 
cliché – open to challenge and nuance, but broadly correct – that the Greek and Roman 
tradition of his time had no real vocabulary to discuss the economy or even conceptualize it 
as a separate realm of human or governmental activity.3 Nor did they have a vocabulary for 
sovereignty, let alone economic sovereignty. 
 
                                                     
1 My own translation. I would like to offer my thanks to all those who helped me as I developed this paper, 
including all the participants of the 2018 MPIL Heidelberg workshop on economic aspects of sovereignty, 
especially Mark Somos and Pamela Edwards; Lisa Eberle; and James Tan, who kindly offered comments. All 
errors remain my own. 
2 For discussion of some exceptions, see Erskine, Andrew. ‘Money-loving Romans’. Papers of the Leeds 
International Latin Seminar 9 (1996), 1-11. 
3 Discussion and references to the wider scholarly debate can be found in Vivenza, Gloria. ‘Roman Economic 
Thought’. In The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Economy, ed. Walter Scheidel (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 25-44. 
My aim in this article, prompted by an interdisciplinary workshop on economic aspects of 
sovereignty held at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International 
Law in Heidelberg, is to investigate what place economic aspects of sovereignty might have 
in our analysis of Rome’s imperial expansion and concomitant political evolution during the 
final phases of the Republic. The result, I hope, will contribute to discussions of the history 
and cross-cultural applicability of modern concepts of economic sovereignty. The fact that 
we cannot rely on ancient discussions of either economics or sovereignty, at least not in 
forms easily recognisable to us, makes my task more difficult. But it is possible to investigate 
analogous ancient concepts and activities. For questions relevant to sovereignty, there is a 
long tradition of scholarship on the creation and location of power, authority, and legitimacy 
within Roman Republican politics both internal and external, and a direct genealogical thread 
links Roman maiestas with the maiestas of Bodin and beyond. This scholarship tends to 
analyse ancient political discourse: Ciceronian treatises, political speeches, and narrative 
histories. More recently, a new generation of researchers has revitalised the study of ancient 
economics using contemporary economic, political, and legal science, primarily by moving 
beyond what the Romans said and wrote to documentary and material evidence for what the 
Romans actually did. My approach in this article, therefore, takes the form of an experiment 
in bringing together insights from these two bodies of scholarship. My choice is derived at 
least in part from the ambiguous positioning of ‘economic sovereignty’ itself between the 
ideological and the practical: where high-minded claims of sovereignty meet hard economic 
reality.  
 
What emerges is something of a crisis of economic sovereignty, or at least a clash between 
discourses of political sovereignty and economics, in the second and first centuries BCE. 
Even as a flourishing political culture allocated political sovereignty to the People, the 
populus Romanus, their economic stake in Rome’s growing empire had all but vanished. 
There are a range of possible ways to explain this paradox. We could note that the scale and 
complexity of empire meant that its economy was decentralized, while politics, and in 
particular the exercise of popular sovereignty, remained wedded to the city of Rome. In 
section 3 I will explore a theory that corporations or mega-rich dynasts effected a form of 
economic ‘state capture’, merely prefiguring the eventual takeover of Roman politics by an 
individual in the form of Augustus. In the final section of this article, however, I argue that as 
well as considering changes in the relationship between the populus and sovereignty, on the 
one hand, and the populus and the economy on the other, we must explore the changes that 
Rome’s expansion wrought on the nature of the populus itself.  
 
1. Political discourse and sovereignty in Republican Rome 
 
Where might we locate political sovereignty in the Republican Roman system? We know less 
than we would like about Rome’s archaic political organization, but by 200 BCE, in what 
Romans themselves recognised had been a process of gradual evolution (Cic. Rep. 2.2), a 
system had developed in which elected magistrates led Rome’s armies and the Senate served 
as the primary forum for debate and the development of policy.4 Magistrates and senators had 
to be wealthy, and usually belonged to a loose group of aristocratic families.5 But the Senate 
was technically a mere advisory body, with no legal powers. Elections and legislation were 
wholly in the control of the people. In theory, the people, or rather the populus, the people 
                                                     
4 For a general overview of the system described in this paragraph, see North, John. ‘The Constitution of the 
Roman Republic’. In A Companion to the Roman Republic, eds. Nathan Rosenstein and Robert Morstein-Marx 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 256-77. 
5 This was not a closed aristocracy of birth: by the start of the period with which I am concerned, the hereditary 
status groups of patricians and plebeians had been replaced by a more fluid grouping of elite families, and ‘new 
men’ could and did rise to join them from time to time – though always from among the same economic class. 
The classic studies can be found in Hopkins, Keith. Death and Renewal. Sociological Studies in Roman History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
drawn up in their voting units by a magistrate, were sovereign, or as close to sovereign as we 
can expect in a time long before the formal development of that concept.6 No regulations 
limited the people’s competency to legislate on any issue; their commands were law.7  
 
Ancient authors versed in Greek political theory understood Republican Rome’s tripartite 
system of magistrates, Senate, and people as a ‘mixed constitution’; later thinkers have given 
it a privileged position as the origin of republicanism, systems of checks and balances, or 
representative democracy.8 But scholars of Roman history have mostly tended to assume that 
the legalities of the (unwritten) constitution were beside the point: the nominally advisory 
Senate and the aristocratic families who dominated it were, it went without saying, the real 
holders of power in Rome. In the final decades of the 20th century, however, Fergus Millar 
drew new attention to the institutions of Republican Rome with a provocative claim that the 
people really did wield power.9 Responses to his work have moved the focus from 
                                                     
6 On sovereignty and the Roman Republic, see Hammer, Dean, Were the People Sovereign in the Roman 
Republic? (Working paper, retrieved from www.polisci.ucla.edu/sites/default/files/u20/5-20-2015_political-
theory-workshop-dean-hammer.pdf, 2015); Hoekstra, Kinch. ‘Athenian Democracy and Popular Tyranny’. In 
Popular Sovereignty in Historical Perspective, eds. R. Bourke and Q. Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), 15-51 has a useful discussion of how one might apply notions of sovereignty to the 
ancient world. 
7 The locus classicus is a phrase Livy quotes in three slightly different versions at 7.17, 9.33, and 9.34, claiming 
(probably anachronistically) that it comes from the Twelve Tables, Rome’s archaic law code: ‘whatever the 
populus Romanus last ordered is law’. For discussion, see Wirszubski, C. Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome 
During the Late Republic and Early Principate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), 83; Zarecki, 
Jonathan. Cicero’s Ideal Statesman in Theory and Practice (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 7; Straumann, 
Benjamin. Crisis and Constitutionalism: Roman Political Thought from the Fall of the Republic to the Age of 
Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 37; Arena, Valentina. Libertas and the Practice of 
Politics in the Late Roman Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 63, all arguing for a 
strong interpretation in terms of popular sovereignty; conversely, Drummond, A. ‘Rome in the Fifth Century II: 
The Citizen Community’. In The Cambridge Ancient History, eds. F. W. Walbank et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 203; Crawford, Michael H., ed. Roman Statutes, 2 vols. (London: Institute of Classical 
Studies, University of London, 1996), 721 and Ando, Clifford. Roman Social Imaginaries: Language and 
Thought in the Context of Empire (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2015), 74 emphasize the procedural, 
reading it as little more than a way of deciding between competing statutes. Further discussion in Russell, Amy. 
‘The Populus Romanus and the Rule of Law’. In The Rule of Law in Ancient Rome, eds. Elly Cowan et al. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
8 A useful overview of the ancient evidence and discussion of the modern reception from a classical perspective 
can be found in Nippel, Wilfried. Ancient and Modern Democracy: Two Concepts of Liberty? (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
9 Millar, Fergus. ‘The Political Character of the Classical Roman Republic, 200-151 BC’. Journal of Roman 
Studies 74 (1984), 1-19; Millar, Fergus. ‘Political Power in Mid-Republican Rome: Curia or Comitium?’ 
Journal of Roman Studies 79 (1989), 138-50; Millar, Fergus. ‘Politics, Persuasion and the People before the 
institutions to political culture.10 Factors from religion to cultural memory to language 
ensured that the elite could take the lead in Roman politics even when their legal power was 
circumscribed; meanwhile, however, the culture of Roman politics did enshrine the sovereign 
power of the people, and measures unpopular among the senators were enacted more 
frequently than some have suspected.11  
 
Scholarly debate on Roman Republican politics, then, could be caricatured as a contest 
between the people and the elite: did ordinary voters have more power, or did the elite hold 
sway? Each individual researcher’s position is, of course, much more nuanced than this 
caricature might suggest; but the overall effect has been to figure the object of study, the 
Roman Republic itself, as locked in a similar battle. In this bipartite model, mass and elite 
struggle to control Rome’s political destiny. Sovereignty is technically located with the 
people, but in practice they are not necessarily free to exercise it.  
 
The political history of the final centuries BCE seems to accord with a bipartite model where 
power is contested between mass and elite. During the third and early second centuries, it 
seems, much daily political business was transacted in the Senate.12 Though senatorial 
decrees were only ever advisory, the people’s input was usually limited to stamping their 
                                                     
Social War (150-90 BC)’. Journal of Roman Studies 76 (1986), 1-11; Millar, Fergus. The Crowd in Rome in the 
Late Republic, Jerome Lectures 22 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). Sir Fergus died in July 
2019, as this article was going to press; he will be sadly missed. 
10 The most important of the immediate responses are found in Jehne, Martin, ed. Demokratie in Rom? Die 
Rolle Des Volkes in Der Politik Der Römischen Republik, Historia Einzelschriften 96 (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 
1995); see Hölkeskamp, K-J. Reconstructing the Roman Republic: An Ancient Political Culture and Modern 
Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010) for a full discussion of ‘political culture’ as an analytic 
tool. Mouritsen, Henrik. Politics in the Roman Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 
provides one accessible account of how these models result in elite-dominated politics in practice. 
11 So e.g. Morstein-Marx, Robert. ‘“Cultural Hegemony” and the Communicative Power of the Roman Elite’. In 
Community and Communication: Oratory and Politics in Republican Rome, eds. Catherine Steel and Henriette 
van der Blom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 29-47. 
12 It is important to bear in mind that our knowledge of the middle centuries of the Republic is based entirely on 
later Republican and imperial sources, all themselves elite, who may be projecting nostalgic fantasies of a 
‘golden age’ of aristocratic domination. 
approval on decisions that had already been made. Over time, however, and often amidst 
major controversy and even violence, more and more issues that had traditionally been settled 
by senatorial consensus were brought to a public vote. In 133 BCE, a date many ancient 
sources treat as the beginning of the ‘fall of the Roman Republic’, the tribune of the plebs 
Tiberius Gracchus apparently defied precedent by drawing on the constitutional power of 
popular sovereignty more directly than previous political norms had allowed.13 He took his 
measures, including bills to distribute public land to Rome’s poor and to finance the new 
farms by taxing the new province of Asia, directly to a vote of the popular assembly, rather 
than waiting for prior approval in the Senate, against the wishes of the senatorial aristocracy. 
In the end, they used violence to stop him, and his brother too a decade later.  
 
The Gracchi were themselves members of the traditional political elite, and exactly how 
radical or unprecedented their actions might have been is debatable.14 They and others who 
followed their example always retained the initiative, and were often simply pursuing 
standard disagreements between aristocrats in new venues. There was no mechanism by 
which ordinary Romans could propose a bill. Yet the new political methods associated with 
the Gracchi provided a live demonstration of the principle of popular sovereignty, and 
ushered in a new reality: during the post-Gracchan period, tribunes of the plebs appealed 
more frequently to the popular assemblies.15  
                                                     
13 The bibliography on the Gracchi is huge. For a useful overview of some recent scholarship, see Santangelo, 
Federico. ‘A Survey of Recent Scholarship on the Age of the Gracchi’. Topoi 15 (2007), 465-510. The best 
analysis of Tiberius’ political method and its implications is Badian, Ernst. ‘Tiberius Gracchus and the 
Beginning of the Roman Revolution.’ Aufsteig und Niedergang der Römischen Welt I.1 (1972), 668-731 
14 In this brief overview, I have followed our sources in positioning 133 BCE as a watershed; reality was almost 
certainly more complex, and the Gracchi had forerunners: see further Taylor, Lily Ross. ‘Forerunners of the 
Gracchi’. Journal of Roman Studies 52 (1962), 19-27; Badian, ‘Tiberius Gracchus’ (n.13); and on the practices 
of our sources, Russell, Amy. ‘The Tribunate of the Plebs as a Magistracy of Crisis’. In Deformations and 
Crises of Ancient Civil Communities, eds. Valerij Goušchin and P.J. Rhodes (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2015), 127-39. 
15 On these new methods and their practitioners, often called popularis (‘populist’), see Robb, Margaret. Beyond 
Populares and Optimates: Political Language in the Late Republic (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2010), arguing 
against any ideological overtones; Arena, Libertas (n.7), with a more ideological reading. Williamson, Callie. 
The Laws of the Roman People: Public Law in the Expansion and Decline of the Roman Republic (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2005), in tables following p.34, tracks the expansion of popular lawmaking in 
 
2. Approaching the Roman Republican economy 
 
The political analyses of the preceding paragraphs, like the Roman texts they draw on as 
source material, have made no mention of economic factors. Yet Rome did have an economy, 
and the changes that the Republic faced in the final centuries BCE, most obviously imperial 
expansion, had clear economic effects.16 Modern scholars have long debated whether 
Romans intended to profit from conquest.17 Yet whether or not it was their goal, vast sums of 
money did flow in to Italy from booty, war indemnities, captured slaves, and taxes, resulting 
in fundamental changes to Roman life.  Recently, Philip Kay has analysed these changes 
anew, and drawn particular attention to the boom in liquidity that characterises Roman 
history after 200 BCE, rightly labelling this the period of Rome’s Economic Revolution.18 
Wagon-loads of coin and bullion were paraded through the city’s streets in triumphs, 
alongside exotic gems and works of art.19 Building boomed, both public and private, while 
the few concrete figures we have for the cost of elite housing seem to show remarkable 
increases.20 The new luxury goods available to wealthy consumers at this period become a 
                                                     
terms of sheer volume: although direct comparisons are difficult because the source material is different for 
different periods, it is suggestive that before 133 BCE the largest number of publicly-voted laws we know of in 
any twenty-five year period is 43 in 224-200 BCE, and most quarter-centuries have fewer than 20; while after 
133 no quarter-century has fewer than 60, and for the period 74-50 BCE we know of 118.  
16 For a precis of the history of scholarship on the Roman economy, and discussion of the methods required to 
do economic history of a culture which had no concept that maps well onto our ‘economy’, see Scheidel, 
Walter. ‘Approaching the Roman Economy’. In The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Economy, ed. Walter 
Scheidel (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-21. 
17 The scholarship on Roman imperialism and economics is vast. Champion, Craige, ed. Roman Imperialism: 
Readings and Sources (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) has a good overview of the debate and 
bibliography. One key point for those claiming that Romans were indifferent to financial gain from imperialism 
is that they often failed to extract as much value from their conquests as they might have done; after defeating 
Macedonia, for example, they seized the royal mines, but rather than working them for profit they closed them 
down (Liv. 45.18; Diod. Sic. 31.8). Tan’s model, discussed below, goes some way towards explaining their 
reticence. 
18 Kay, Philip. Rome’s Economic Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
19 See Östenberg, Ida. Staging the World: Spoils, Captives, and Representations in the Roman Triumphal 
Procession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
20 On building: Bernard, Seth. Building Mid-Republican Rome: Labour, Architecture, and the Roman Economy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). Cost of elite housing: Kay, Rome’s Economic Revolution 2014 (n.18) 
289. 
trope in our literary sources: Livy dilates on one-legged tables, fine tapestries, slaves trained 
as luxury chefs.21 The archaeological evidence for changes in land tenure and exploitation 
remains controversial. But one fact stands out: after 168 BCE, Rome was so flush from 
conquest that citizens were no longer required to pay tax.22   
 
In his 2017 monograph Power and Public Finance at Rome (264-49 BCE), James Tan 
proposes a model of the Roman Republican economy and its development during this period 
based on a three-way relationship between elite aristocrats, the state, and the people.23 Tan’s 
model adds a third element, the state, to the (oversimplified, but potentially useful) bipartite 
model of elite and people outlined above. Just as in the case of economics and sovereignty, 
‘the state’ is a modern concept and not necessarily immediately applicable to the Roman 
case. Yet I focus my discussion of the Roman economy around Tan’s model because 
introducing this third element brings us closer to modern approaches to economic 
sovereignty, which tend to be premised on the state.  
 
When Rome first began its overseas expansion, there was no system in place determining 
how the new territory should be exploited, or how the profits should be distributed. Earlier 
expansion within Italy had not raised the same questions: booty, it seems, was largely 
distributed directly to the soldiers, while the defeated communities were forced into unequal 
alliances in which they contributed not money, but troops for future campaigns. The money 
available from the conquest of both metal-rich Hispania and the Hellenistic kingdoms was on 
a completely different level; meanwhile, extracting value from the territories in cash or kind 
                                                     
21 Liv. 39.6. 
22 Plin. HN 33.56. The tax stopped after 168 was the tributum, an annual property levy. Citizens were still liable 
to other incidental levies such as a 5% tax on the manumission of slaves; harbour dues continued until they too 
were abolished in 60 BCE (Cic. ad Qu. fr. 1.1.3). 
23 Tan, James. Power and Public Finance at Rome, 264-49 BCE (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).  
rather than manpower required new institutions. Tan argues that senators and generals 
worked hard to keep the state institutions small, and the bulk of the new revenues out of the 
treasury’s hands. Taxation in newly-conquered territories, along with many other functions, 
was hired out to contractors, the tax-farmers or publicani, while governors themselves both 
invested and extracted large amounts of their own private funds in their provinces.24 This was 
not because of ideological distaste for ‘big government’, but so that the Roman elite 
themselves could claim the lion’s share of the new prosperity.  
 
The second part of Tan’s model concerns the money that did come to the treasury. Even once 
generals and tax-farmers had taken their share, the new revenues changed the financial basis 
on which the state operated. Previously, state expenditure (primarily for war) had been 
financed by a variable levy on citizen property known as tributum.25 With new money 
coming in, Romans might have decided to expand the state’s activities, providing welfare, 
new public building, or other benefits for the citizens (Tan makes a useful comparison with 
Saudi Arabia’s use of oil revenue). But they – and we have to imagine that the impetus for 
this decision came from the elite – chose a different path. After 168 BCE, the tributum was 
not levied.26 
 
In Tan’s model, the elite moved simultaneously to reduce their own dependence on the state 
and to reduce the state’s dependence on citizen taxation. The result was a state that stayed 
small, and a citizen body which lost its role as the main contributor to and stakeholder in the 
state’s activity. Tan analyses evidence for the role of the popular assemblies before and after 
                                                     
24 A treatment of the publicani from an explicitly legal and economic angle can be found in Malmendier, Ulrike. 
Societas Publicanorum (Cologne: Böhlau, 2002). 
25 Tributum was not technically a tax, but Tan argues that it operated as one for all practical purposes.  
26 There may have been a brief revival of tributum during the civil wars of the first century BCE; for full 
discussion, see Nicolet, Claude. Tributum (Bonn: Habelt, 1976). 
the end of tributum, and concludes that elite politicians consulted and deferred to popular 
assemblies more readily before 168 BCE than after, especially on matters of finance (which, 
in practice, means war finance). Eventually, the rich had financial resources that outstripped 
the state, while the state treasury was no longer funded by the people. The result was that 
aristocratic politicians and generals were no longer required to pay heed to the will of the 
sovereign people. The people were doubly marginalized: both denied a fair share of the new 
wealth, and denied their traditional political role in managing it. 
 
Tan’s economic history of the late Republic reaches a conclusion that might seem 
diametrically opposed to the one I laid out in the previous section. There, I sketched an 
argument that the political discourse of the period was increasingly focused on popular 
sovereignty: whether we believe the people’s power was real or an illusion, claims to be 
consulting the sovereign people’s will became more and more important. For Tan, as the 
people’s contribution to state finances dwindled, the practical importance of popular 
sovereignty diminished. For the present investigation of economic aspects of sovereignty, it 
is not enough to point to a gap between (political) discourse and (economic) reality: even if 
such a difference could be fully theorized and justified, economic sovereignty belongs on 
both sides of the divide. Instead, in the next two sections I examine the other major difference 
between the two models: the introduction of a ‘state’ element.  
 
3. The ‘state’ in practice 
 
From Machiavelli to the Founding Fathers and beyond, philosophers and politicians have 
looked to the Roman Republic as a model for a republican polity. But there are fundamental 
differences between Republican Rome and the modern nation state; as I have emphasised, 
Romans had no concepts that map well onto statehood or sovereignty, let alone economic 
sovereignty. Yet for precisely this reason, Rome has lessons for us today just as it did for 
previous generations. The pre-modern, pre-state world can be a fertile ground of comparisons 
with a post-modern, increasingly post-state age.27 Tan’s interpretation of the activities of 
generals and corporations in the provinces could be understood as a struggle for economic 
sovereignty fought between elites and the state. Was this the source of the Republican crisis 
of economic sovereignty? His model of the Roman economy speaks interestingly to today’s, 
in which global corporations can outspend governments. When these non-state actors have 
the capacity to determine the choices sovereign countries make, including the regulatory 
systems that constrain the corporations themselves, we can speak of ‘state capture’. Similarly, 
in Rome, corporations of publicani had outsize political influence, though the real 
competition to the state came from individuals, members of the elite like Crassus, Pompey, 
and Caesar who could fund entire armies from their own pockets.28  
 
But there are also important differences between the processes Tan identifies in action at 
Rome and state capture in our own time. The most obvious is the notion of ‘state’ we are 
invoking. If there was anything like a ‘state’ in Roman times, it was a pre-Westphalian, non-
Weberian protostate. Tan dispenses with these objections neatly and convincingly. His 
tripartite model of people, elites, and state does not require any particularly developed notion 
of the nation-state. Instead, he confines his notion of ‘state’ to a set of institutions that were 
clearly understood as ‘public’, in the sense that they were under the control of rotating 
magistrates rather than individuals or families. The treasury, the army, the census: these were 
                                                     
27 At the Heidelberg workshop, Kanad Bagchi gave a paper on the post-modern state as increasingly detached 
from territorial sovereignty. 
28 Plutarch, Crassus 2 reports that Crassus said no man could be counted rich if he could not maintain an army 
from his private income. 
understood as public rather than private, however much individual members of the elite 
managed to blur the lines.  
 
Even once we have adopted a limited definition of the state, however, applying the notion of 
state capture to Tan’s model proves problematic. In a second sense, too, there was no ‘state’ 
to capture: the institutions that Tan entirely sensibly describes using the term ‘state’ were 
themselves developing at the same time as powerful individuals and corporations were 
seeking to control them. Rather than taking over the new depersonalized, ‘public’ institutions, 
they retarded their development – but even a formulation along those lines is dangerous, 
implying as it does a teleological model in which powerful state institutions along modern 
lines are the obvious end goal. Members of the elite opposed developments that strike us as 
state-like, but was anyone arguing for a more thoroughly state-like set of institutions? 
 
To unpick these distinctions, we must go back to the beginning. Why and how did state-like 
institutions develop in Rome in the first place? I identify at least three different foci around 
which they grew up: two of them pragmatic, in the Tan line, and one more ideological, but no 
less important. The first two are a) the institutions of war and resource extraction from the 
provinces, on which Tan focuses, and b) the institutions of political life back at Rome; the 
third is the role of the populus Romanus, the Roman People themselves, as the institution 
conceptualized most closely to what we today might think of as a ‘state’. 
 
Though the details remain open for debate, scholars today tend to picture archaic Italian and 
Latin society as organised into loose groups, perhaps claiming clan-type kinship links and led 
by ‘big men’ that might best be identified as warlords.29 Two main factors prompted them to 
                                                     
29 So e.g. Richardson, James H. ‘The People and the State in Early Rome’. In The Citizen, Past and Present, 
eds. A Brown and J Griffiths (Auckland: Massey, 2017), 63-91; Smith, Christopher J. The Roman Clan: The 
create, and give up parts of their control to, depersonalized institutions: warfare and 
competition. Paul Erdkamp has analysed the role of war in state formation at Rome.30 Rome 
was predicated on conquest, with cultural and economic drivers to warfare that could not be 
resisted. But any expedition larger than a cattle raid demanded institutional structures. For the 
elites, banding together and placing war in the hands of a public army extended their reach: 
they could use the joint resources of multiple groups to achieve greater conquests than any 
single individual or family could manage alone. The army was the original state institution. 
But elements of private finance were always present in Roman war, and not as innovations of 
a wealthier late Republic but as survivals of the earlier age of warlords.31 Pompey’s soldiers 
and veterans could be counted on to be personally loyal to him, in later years partly because 
he supplemented their official pay from his own pocket – but originally because many of 
their fathers had been loyal to his father, and so on backwards through the generations of 
farmers working on the Pompeius family estates in Picenum.32 They were clients of the 
Pompei, like the clients Scipio Aemilianus took with him to Numantia when no levies could 
be held to support his campaign in 132 BCE,33 and not so different from the army of Fabii 
who fought a private war against Veii in the 5th century.34 The public army was always 
overlaid on a prior substrate. 
 
                                                     
Gens from Ancient Ideology to Modern Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
Terrenato, Nicola and Donald C Haggis, eds. State Formation in Italy and Greece: Questioning the Neo-
Evolutionist Paradigm (Oxford: Oxbow, 2011). 
30 Erdkamp, Paul. ‘War and State Formation in the Roman Republic’. In A Companion to the Roman Army, ed. 
Paul Erdkamp (Chichester: Blackwell, 2007), 96-113. 
31 Bleckmann, Bruno. ‘Roman War Finances in the Age of the Punic Wars’. In Money and Power in the Roman 
Republic, eds. Hans Beck, Martin Jehne, and John Serrati (Brussels: Latomus, 2016), 82-96 collects plenty of 
examples. 
32 Plut. Pomp. 6 is explicit on this point: he raised his first extra-legal army to aid Sulla in Rome’s first civil war 
in 83 BCE, at the age of just 22; he paid for the equipment himself, but the men of Picenum agreed to fight for 
him because he was his father’s son. 
33 App. Hisp. 84. 
34 Livy 2.48-50.  
The other factor that encouraged the development of public institutions at Rome was elite 
competition. The state made war, but also made peace: its political institutions provided a 
neutral political zone in which the opportunities provided for war (and, later, other activities) 
could be debated and allocated to leaders in turn without violent zero-sum internal 
competition.35 These political institutions had to be depersonalized and public: no one 
individual or family could dominate. 
 
Both of these functions of the state served elite goals up to a point.36 Tan points out very 
clearly that it remained in the elite’s interest to keep the state’s role in warfare relatively 
small, since they could thus keep its share of the profits small too (and their own greater). 
And as individuals got richer and could achieve more and more with their own private 
resources, each generation of aristocrats had less need of the magnifying power of the state 
than their fathers and grandfathers. The consequences were not so much state capture as a 
return to warlordism, with civil war commanders maintaining private armies until in the final 
and decisive war Octavian (the future Augustus) based his claim to legitimacy not on any 
magistracy but on a personal oath sworn to him by his soldiers and all the communities of 
Italy.37 
 
But the end result of the ‘small state’ in civil war points to a tension with the role of state 
institutions in regulating elite competition. Most Roman senators deplored, rather than 
applauded, the private armies eventually wielded by a Pompey or an Octavian in the horrific 
                                                     
35 We can see the same process operate in concrete terms in the development of public space, the literal location 
of this neutral interaction and the focus of my own previous work in Russell, Amy. The Politics of Public Space 
in Republican Rome (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). Elite individuals and families were 
always seeking to lay claim to this space, including by using their own money to build ‘public’ structures or by 
emphasising the personal role that they or their ancestors had taken when making interventions with public 
money, and thus take control of the political activities that took place there.  
36 We might compare neo-Beardian analyses of the role of elite financial interests in the US constitution, as 
discussed by George Gallwey at the Heidelberg workshop. 
37 Augustus, Res Gestae 25. 
civil wars that ended the Republic for good. For the ordinary members of Rome’s economic, 
political, and social elite, the state’s political institutions were vital to restricting the 
opportunities available to individuals among their number. Although they were presumably 
naturally keen to maintain their class interests as a group, both political and financial, and 
saw the state as their competitor in that sense, they also needed the state to maintain the 
balance of power between themselves. At the same time as some generals and financiers were 
extracting more and more private profit from Rome’s provinces, others were working to 
regularise the ways in which both power and profit was distributed. A series of new laws 
laying down strict procedures for elections, from minimum ages for office-holding and limits 
on repeated tenure to the introduction of a secret ballot, were passed during the second 
century BCE; meanwhile new crimes and new courts were set up in an attempt to tackle 
peculation by provincial governors.38 Direct commercial exploitation of Rome’s imperial 
conquests also gradually came under greater state control. Lisa Eberle has examined how 
new legal systems arose in the provinces, where politicians serving as generals and governors 
were sometimes in cahoots with and sometimes at odds with wealthy civilian Roman 
investors.39 The aim of the new institutions was to help Roman elite commercial interests, 
but, like the political institutions at Rome, they did so by creating a neutral, depersonalized 
‘state’ framework that could arbitrate in cases of conflict and competition, rather than 
allowing any single individual or corporation free rein. Giving all these institutions more 
teeth expanded the state. 
 
An even more concrete example is the role of public money in the distribution of grain. For 
centuries, it seems, wealthy Roman families had given out cheap or free grain to their poorer 
                                                     
38 For an overview of the changes, see Flower, Harriet. Roman Republics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2010), 61-9. 
39 Eberle, Lisa. Land, Law, and Territories. The Roman Diaspora and the Making of Provincial Administration. 
PhD., Berkeley, 2014, esp. 76-115. 
neighbours. In return, they got loyalty, often in the form of votes. In the late Republic, 
Romans told stories of the evils of those who had gone too far, attempting to use their private 
wealth to hand out too much grain and gain too much popularity (Liv. 4.13-16). In the 
legends, these men were dealt with by force. In historical times, their examples were used to 
tar the name of politicians who promoted centrally-subsidised grain distributions as 
dangerous anti-senatorial populists, and of course these reformers did win plenty of adherents 
for their policies.40 But consider a world in which so much money had flowed (unequally) 
into the upper echelons of Roman society that Crassus was able to give every single Roman 
three months’ worth of grain in 70 BCE (Plut. Crass. 12.2). Yes, the move to public grain 
distributions removed opportunities from individual members of the elite and gave them 
instead to a rotating cast of office-holders; but it also reduced the chances that one individual 
could so thoroughly outbid the rest.41  
 
This gradual process of state expansion, rather than contraction, can be interpreted in several 
ways, from a breakdown of aristocratic consensus (unwritten norms were no longer being 
respected and had to be written down) to a power grab by the people, but they were also 
undoubtedly the result of elite consensus in themselves, or they could never have passed. The 
majority of the elite used them to rein in the excesses of the most popular and prosperous, 
those whose runaway success threatened to limit the opportunities left to the rest of them. 
 
                                                     
40 For the moralizing discourse surrounding Gracchan attempts to distribute grain (and indeed land), see Coffee, 
Neil. Gift and Gain: How Money Transformed Ancient Rome (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 79-
85. The Gracchi and their supporters criticized the rich for avarice, fitting well a narrative in which the elite 
sought to keep the profits of empire for themselves. Their opponents accused the Gracchi themselves of greed 
for power, but Coffee sees their proposals as an attempt at institutionalizing traditions of aristocratic generosity. 
41 On the economics of the move, see Garnsey, Peter and Dominic Rathbone, ‘The Background to the Grain 
Law of Gaius Gracchus’. Journal of Roman Studies 75 (1985), 20-25. 
So we have two forms of ‘state’ in Tan’s pragmatic formulation – the set of institutions that 
combines individual effort into collective conquest and resource extraction from conquered 
territories, and the set of institutions that ensure a neutral political zone – both of which 
served elite interests at least as much as they opposed them. As the economic revenues of 
Roman imperialism increased, the two faced different pressures, again from the elite. The 
institutions of collective military action and provincial exploitation were not allowed to 
expand, and even forced to contract. But as the stakes grew ever higher, it was in the interest 
of the majority of rich (but not super-rich) Romans that depoliticized political institutions 
maintained and indeed expanded their role in distributing the profits of conquest. Much more 
could be said – but the important point to note for the purposes of this article is that importing 
a contemporary model of state capture does not serve to explain the problems Republican 
Rome faced. 
 
 4. The state in theory 
 
How can the tripartite elite-state-people model developed in Tan’s economic analysis be 
reconciled with the binary elite-people division emerging from political history? Although, as 
explored in the previous section, many of the institutions identified there as state-like were 
developed by and in the interests of the elite, from the perspective of Roman political 
discourse they are linked closely to the people. The army was the people: the entire adult 
male citizenry was liable to military service, and they often voted in their army units.42 
Meanwhile, the institutions of politics defused elite rivalries precisely by handing sovereignty 
to the people: it was their votes that decided the issue. Drawing on the sociological theories 
                                                     
42 The very word populus originally meant ‘army’: Momigliano, Arnaldo. “The Origins of the Roman 
Republic.” In Interpretation: Theory and Practice, ed. C. S. Singleton (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1969), 1-34. 
of Georg Simmel, Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp has explained how a fundamentally aristocratic 
political culture can turn to the people as, essentially, a neutral referee and arbiter of 
individual excellence.43  
 
The people, then, were closely associated with Tan’s pragmatically-defined state-like 
institutions. And the links between the people and concepts analogous to the modern state go 
further still. If Romans had ever wanted to express a concept along the lines of today’s 
‘state’, the entity like ‘UK’ or ‘Germany’ that claims territorial sovereignty, for example, it 
would not have been Roma, and certainly not the res publica, but the populus Romanus, the 
Roman People.44 ‘Rome’ itself had no legal definition; the populus was the concrete 
institution. The maiestas that would become Bodin’s keyword for sovereignty was the 
maiestas populi Romani, the majesty of the Roman populus.45 In the Latin political 
vocabulary, it was the populus Romanus that waged wars, made alliances, and maintained its 
international standing.46 It was the populus Romanus that took over the political sovereignty 
of the subordinate Italian allies in the fourth and third centuries BCE, claiming for itself the 
right to decide how and where they waged war; and given that warfare was so predominant in 
all such communities’ financial affairs, it is no great leap to say that the populus Romanus 
                                                     
43 Hölkeskamp, 2010 (n. 10). The formulation of the people as “referee” is taken from North, John. ‘Democratic 
Politics in Republican Rome’. Past and Present 126 (1990), 3-21. In Hölkeskamp’s model, the terms of the 
competition are still dictated by the elite, so the people’s arbitration function still falls short of anything we 
might call sovereignty. In theory, however, the people also controlled the rules of the game, and could wield 
their power to defy the rules (by, for example, electing a man whom either law or the unspoken norms of 
aristocratic competition deemed ineligible); what is up for debate, then, is to what extent theory was carried 
through into practice. 
44 On the res publica, see now Moatti, Claudia. Res Publica. Histoire Romaine De La Chose Publique (Paris: 
Fayard, 2018). Hodgson, Louise. Res Publica and the Roman Republic: Without Body or Form (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), 7 points out that Cicero’s definition of res publica at Rep. 1.39 begins by defining 
populus. The use of SPQR to name the state is an imperial development: Moatti, Claudia. “Res Publica, Forma 
Rei Publicae, and SPQR.” BICS 60 (2017): 34-48. 
45 Discussion in Hammer, ‘Were the People Sovereign’ (n.6). 
46 The phrase ‘allies of the populus Romanus appears in e.g. the epigraphically-known text of the lex Antonia de 
Termessibus. A tiny sample of many literary attestations: ‘the populus Romanus destroyed Numantia’ (Rhet. 
Her. 4.37); ‘no king can make war on the populus Romanus’ (Cic. Cat. 2.11); where we would say ‘the history 
of Rome’, Cato the Elder wrote about ‘the deeds of the populus Romanus’ (Festus 216). 
also took over their economic sovereignty. Most strikingly for any analysis in terms of 
economic sovereignty, it was the populus Romanus that owned all Rome’s common property, 
from the ager publicus populi Romani (a phrase repeated again and again in surviving 
agrarian statues of all periods, meaning ‘public land belonging to the Roman people’) to the 
money in the treasury.47 
 
Tan’s pragmatic definition of the state makes sense for his own arguments, but my attempts 
to bring in economic aspects of sovereignty run into problems when confronted with the 
Roman thought-world. How can a tripartite model of elite, state, and people work in a world 
where the people are the state? When we try to squeeze Tan’s arguments into the language of 
political scholarship without a third ‘state’ element, they have to be compressed into what 
looks like another example of a straightforward struggle between people and elite – and one 
which the elite win, as they waltz off with the profits of empire. But how can this be squared 
with the continued importance of popular sovereignty in politics? Perhaps the solution is to 
locate the tripartite model entirely in the hard-nosed world of Realpolitik and dismiss the 
sovereignty of the populus as mere discourse. But the consequences of this discourse are 
worth further exploration. Sovereignty, including economic sovereignty, cannot be easily 
reduced to well-defined legal institutions or Realpolitik: if it could, there would be no need 
for workshops on the topic. The maiestas of the populus Romanus was generated, defined, 
and bounded through complex and ongoing relationships between Romans (and non-
Romans), and its economic role was no less determined by cultural factors than any other 
sphere of its operation. The economic results of these relationships can be analysed on a 
purely pragmatic level; if we want to pin down something we might call sovereignty, 
however, we must look beyond the what to the how and the why. 
                                                     
47 Treasury: e.g. Cic. Verr. 2.3.202. 
 
5. Which people, and why? 
 
So far I have focused on the ‘state’ element of Tan’s tripartite model. But the other two also 
deserve attention. It is not always easy to know which individuals, and which economic 
interests, should be assigned to the ‘elite’ and which to the ‘people’. The confusion has 
already surfaced in the previous section, in which I looked at the varying interests of the 
super-rich dynast and the ordinary senator, or the possibility of conflict between provincial 
governor and civilian investor. But identifying the elite is less my concern in this paper than 
identifying the people.  
 
Many modern explanations of the Roman Republic’s political system, including in large part 
Millar’s claim that we should take its ‘democratic’ element seriously, take their start from 
Polybius’ description of Rome’s mixed constitution. The three elements – magistrates, 
senate, and people – are bound to each other, he claims, by mutual obligations, which force 
them to respect each others’ interests and thus act as checks and balances on each other. But 
when we look at the obligations he assigns to the popular element of his model, it becomes 
clear that there is already a confusion about who exactly counts as the people. The consuls 
must respect the people because the people are the ultimate sovereign, the arbiters of peace 
and war (6.15): this is the official populus Romanus as abstract entity. The senate, too, must 
respect the people because of the populus’s sovereign lawmaking power (6.16). But when we 
hear of what the people owe to the senate and the consuls, the picture gets murkier: 
Through the whole of Italy a vast number of contracts, which it would not be easy to 
enumerate, are given out by the censors for the construction and repair of public 
buildings, and besides this there are many things which are farmed, such as navigable 
rivers, harbours, gardens, mines, lands, in fact everything that forms part of the 
Roman dominion. Now all these matters are undertaken by the people, and one may 
almost say that everyone is interested in these contracts and the work they involved. 
For certain people are the actual purchasers from the censors of the contracts, others 
are the partners of these first, others stand surety for them, others pledge their own 
fortunes to the state for this purpose. Now in all these matters the senate is supreme. It 
can grant extension of time; it can relieve the contractor if any accident occurs; and if 
the work proves to be absolutely impossible to carry out it can liberate him from his 
contract. There are in fact many ways in which the senate can either benefit or 
indicate those who manage public property, as all these matters are referred to it. 
What is even most important is that the judges in most civil trials, whether public or 
private, are appointed from its members, where the action involves large interests. So 
that all citizens being at the mercy of the senate, and looking forward with alarm to 
the uncertainty of litigation, are very shy of obstructing or resisting its decisions. 
Similarly everyone is reluctant to oppose the projects of the consuls as all are 
generally and individually under their authority when in the field.   
Plb. 6.17, trans. Paton 
 
To begin at the end of the passage: the people must respect the consuls’ authority, because 
the consuls as generals have supreme power in the field. The people, here, are the army: no 
surprise, in Roman culture, where the word populus originally meant ‘army’. Citizens and 
soldiers were one and the same.  
 
But when we examine what the passage says about the relationship between people and 
senate, the groups involved are suddenly radically different. The people must defer to the 
senate because the senate controls the public contracts on which they bid and in which they 
invest; and because they staff the courts which made decisions involving ‘large interests’ – 
presumably disputes over these same contracts. The ‘people’ involved in these transactions 
are not the entire populus Romanus, nor are they the ‘people’ as opposed to the ‘elite’: rank-
and-file soldiers, workmen, and the subsistence farmers who made up the majority of Rome’s 
people did not hold financial interests in public contracting. In Tan’s model, government 
contractors form part of the elite whose private enterprise siphoned money away from public 
institutions. For Polybius, at least in this clause, these are the people, and the poor do not get 
a mention at all.48  
 
Tan’s model makes productive use of the ambiguities inherent in different conceptualizations 
of the people. Indeed, one of the major contributions he makes is the argument that in the late 
third century BCE the people with whom the elite interacted were primarily identified as 
those who paid tax (and thus had a say), while in the first century BCE they were primarily 
identified as those eligible to receive public benefits (and thus were figured as petitioners 
begging for benefactions to be determined by the elite). His emphasis on taxpayers as 
stakeholders also convincingly does away with the enduring idea that it was through military 
service that Roman citizens earned their right to be consulted on political issues: the numbers 
actually serving in any given campaign were small. But other potential definitions of ‘the 
people’ deserve exploration. The electorate was not exactly identical with the taxpayers, for 
example: some were too poor to pay the tax (a percentage of property) but still had votes. 
And both the tax base and the imagined electorate were far from identical with the actual 
electorate that showed up to vote on any given occasion, especially in the final years of the 
Republic. 
 
The difference between people and The People has occupied political thinkers from Cicero to 
Rousseau to today. But in Rome, things were (at least from a certain point of view) 
remarkably simple. The People, the political institution with sovereign power (of a sort), was 
the populus Romanus. The definition of the populus Romanus is the focus of my current 
research. Unlike in most other cultures, the populus is a first-order concept. By that, I mean 
                                                     
48 In a sense this is hardly surprising: Polybius, a member of the Greek political and social elite who spent his 
time as a Roman hostage treated like an honoured guest in the house of one of Rome’s richest families, probably 
rarely met or had cause to think of the economic or political interests of an actual ordinary person.  
that the citizenry is not defined by reference to the state, or concepts of politics, or anything 
else; the populus is the category to which others refer. What is publicus, public, up to and 
including the res publica, is so because of its relationship to the populus. In the famous 
formulation Cicero gives to Scipio (Rep. 1.39), res publica res populi: the res publica is a 
thing belonging to a populus.49  
 
As we might expect, the populus is a far more complex institution than just ‘the population’. 
As soon as Cicero’s Scipio says that the res publica is the res populi, he immediately starts 
shutting down the more radical implications of that phrase by narrowing down which groups 
of humans can or cannot be a populus. His is a philosophical definition, but there were plenty 
of more practical ones too: of course the populus only consisted of adult citizen males who 
are not disqualified in some way.50 Though it could be called upon in the abstract, it only 
appeared in reality as a populus when it was drawn up by a magistrate;51 when it expressed its 
sovereign will, it did so via internal voting divisions by property class.52  
 
                                                     
49 On the property metaphor, see esp. Arena, Libertas 2012 (n.7). 
50 The economic prosperity of this group rested on internal as well as internal violence: this was a slave society, 
and before the period that either Tan or I consider, Rome’s political economy had already undergone a dramatic 
transformation during an earlier stage of territorial expansion in central Italy itself. Slavery had always existed 
at Rome, but it is in the fourth and third centuries BCE that our sources speak of mass enslavement of defeated 
enemies, whose labour gradually replaced forced labour by Roman citizens through debt-bondage or corvées. 
For a recent discussion of this change, see Bernard, Seth. ‘Debt, Land, and Labor in the Early Republican 
Economy’. Phoenix 70 (2016), 317-38. 
51 On the constitution of the populus by the magistrate, see esp. Hölkeskamp, K-J. ‘Friends, Romans, 
Countrymen: Addressing the Roman People and the Rhetoric of Inclusion’. In Community and Communication: 
Oratory and Politics in Republican Rome, eds. Catherine Steel and Henriette van der Blom (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 11-28.  
52 The Romans believed these groups corresponded to army divisions; they also certainly related to wealth and 
thus to taxation, and in some voting assemblies the system of group voting allocated wealthier citizens to 
smaller groups, and thus gave them votes that were individually more powerful. We could see in these wealth 
classes a link between taxes and votes. But not all voting assemblies worked in this way: laws were mostly 
passed by assemblies divided by tribes, a category with origins in the voters’ place of residence. On voting 
groups, a key point of reference is still Taylor, Lily Ross. Roman Voting Assemblies: From the Hannibalic War 
to the Dictatorship of Caesar (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966). 
But it was this group as a whole, the idealised populus Romanus, to which Roman political 
discourse allocated both sovereignty and indeed ownership, in the property metaphor res 
publica res populi. When Cicero talks to the people of foreign policy, he speaks of their 
revenues, their provinces.53 We could choose to link this metaphor to imperial expansion: res 
publica most definitely does not mean ‘state’, but something more like ‘public affairs’, and it 
became easier to conceive of any individual or group ‘owning’ the res publica once affairs of 
public interest became tangible in the form of a territorial empire.54 Land was the archetypal 
form of property; the new overseas territories were the property of the populus Romanus.55 
But the ownership metaphor was at least potentially present much earlier than Cicero: the 
phrase res publica populi Romani (‘the commonwealth of the Roman people’) may have 
appeared in a hymn written in 207 BCE by Livius Andronicus, the earliest Latin author 
whose name we know, and is also attested in texts both Varro and Livy report as authentic 
archaic ritual formulations.56 
 
If we bear these traces of longstanding political discourse in mind, the calls of a Gracchus or 
a Clodius for the proceeds of empire to be shared more equally begin to look less like a 
populist demand for new entitlements and more like a persistence of older understandings 
that Roman citizens have a pre-existing claim, including an economic claim, to the res 
publica. It is a relationship which was expressed not in terms of notional taxpayer rights 
(including in the absence of tax) but in terms of ownership. Insofar as there was a concrete 
                                                     
53 E.g. Leg. Man. 5; also in a fragment of a speech of Gaius Gracchus preserved in Gell. NA. 11.10. 
54 On defining the phrase res publica, see the scholarship cited in n.44. 
55 The change relates in part to the changing meaning of the Latin word imperium, which would eventually 
come to denote (territorial) ‘empire’ but which was originally a more abstract term for ‘power’. Like maiestas, 
our Republican sources assign it to the people (imperium populi Romani), but the people’s empire could be 
understood as their literal property more easily than the people’s power could. 
56 Livius Andronicus: Festus 333. (Purportedly) archaic ritual texts: e.g. Varr.  LL. 6.86; Liv. 22.10. 
institution at the heart of the Roman project, it was the populus Romanus, and they owned all 
the land that Rome claimed and all the gold in the treasury. 
 
The people’s ownership of provincial revenues was not explicitly based on their contributions 
as taxpayers, or their position as citizens to whom the magistrates were required to provide 
grain and other commoda (the Latin for what an American politician would call 
‘entitlements’). Tan traces the progression from taxpayers to beneficiaries based on 
pragmatics: to what extent the elite consulted them, and on what issues. Perhaps political 
rhetoric is just that: rhetoric. And yet the insistence of Roman political culture to at least pay 
lip service to popular sovereignty had practical consequences too. In practice, the elite 
controlled the purse-strings; but sovereignty figured as ownership belonged to the people. 
 
One of the diagnostic episodes Tan cites took place in 253 BCE.57 In the midst of the first 
Punic War, the voting assemblies refused to countenance further public spending on fleets, 
which had not been particularly successful so far. Yet the fleet was eventually built, after the 
elite resorted to borrowing from their own private funds. Tan cogently argues that the 
people’s control over spending in war was limited precisely to public money; the elite could 
and did continue to prosecute the war in the way they chose, so long as they could avoid 
calling on the treasury. For Tan, this was ‘something akin to a tax revolt’, though ‘an 
oxymoronic tax revolt: a revolt by a sovereign’.58 The people were protesting qua taxpayers, 
and got their way – a leverage that they lost after the end of tributum.59 But we should not 
forget that there were also actual revolts.  
                                                     
57 Discussion and sources in Tan, Power and Public Finance 2017 (n.23), 109. 
58 Tan, Power and Public Finance 2017 (n.23), 114. 
59 Tellingly, we do not see revolts in this or later periods of the people qua army: Rome had a long and storied 
myth-historical tradition of plebeian secessions that were, essentially, army strikes, but by the middle Republic 
popular resistance at the levy seems to have been confined to individuals protesting arbitrary treatment (or, 
indeed, members of the elite protecting their friends). Tan is probably right to tie the lack of political pressure 
 
In the period before the Punic Wars, these revolts have come down to us in myth-history as 
secessions. The Romans believed that the people’s political rights had been won and 
defended during the fourth and third centuries BCE through a process we know as the 
‘struggle of the orders’. Protesting the political dominance of the hereditary aristocrats known 
as the patricians (not to be confused with the looser ‘elite’ of later centuries), the story goes, 
the plebeians, forming the vast majority of the Romans, withdrew from the community 
entirely, seceding to a nearby hill.60 In what capacity did these citizens protest? There were 
also important economic dimensions: one of their demands was the abolition of nexum or 
debt-bondage, into which some Romans had fallen not because of the distress caused by 
tributum but by the exactions of their landlords. They were not protesting as economic 
stakeholders in Tan’s sense, but as citizens who deserved the right of liberty, including both 
personal freedom and the right to political participation.61 Their physical move to absent 
themselves, especially since the secessions always come at times when Rome is under 
external threat, suggests something more along the lines of an army strike than a tax revolt. 
But it is what they did when they got to their new location that is most interesting: they began 
to set up their own political institutions, institutions which would survive and become 
incorporated into the standard governmental apparatus of Rome. James Richardson, in a 
provocative reading, notes the frequency with which modern scholars refer to these new 
plebeian institutions as ‘a state within a state’; why, he asks, should we not conceive of them 
                                                     
via the army as a result of the reduced population serving at any one time. By the first century BCE, the army 
was well on the way to forming its own separate political constituency: Gabba, Republican Rome: The Army 
and the Allies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976). 
60 I have kept my narrative deliberately general, because of the difficulty of reconstructing and analyzing 
Rome’s early quasi-mythical history; a good historical introduction can be found in Cornell, Tim. The 
Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000-264 BC) (London; 
Routledge, 1995), 242-71. For further socio-economic analysis, see Raaflaub, Kurt (ed.) Social Struggles in 
Archaic Rome: New Perspectives on the Conflict of the Orders (Malden, MA; Blackwell, 2nd edn, 2005). 
61 On libertas, see esp. Arena, Libertas 2012 (n.7). 
as just a state, and indeed the first state?62 Here is a third origin story for the state-like 
institutions of Republican Rome: it was the people’s demand for political representation that 
prompted something analogous state formation. For my purposes, what matters is that the 
plebeians (not the entire populus, but once they had won their concessions the distinction 
ceased to matter) revolted not qua taxpayers and not only qua soldiers, but also qua citizens, 
and with an implicit demonstration that had a fundamental claim to control, and even to 
embody, the public institutions we see as state-like. 
 
In the post-Gracchan period, we read more about urban riots which map well onto Tan’s 
model of the people configured as recipients of public benefits.63 But there were other signs 
of discontent, on a broader scale. Armed uprisings shook the countryside as well as the city. 
It is possible that the Gracchi themselves had a hand in provoking these conflicts, as their 
land redistributions disadvantaged some while benefitting others: the town of Fregellae 
revolted in 125 BCE, just as the impact of Tiberius’ reforms would have been felt.64 Some 
forty years after the first distributions, in 91 BCE, Rome’s Italian allies revolted en masse. 
Until this point, full citizenship and political rights had been restricted to Romans, officially 
those with ancestral ties to the city of Rome itself, even though Rome’s civic institutions and 
indeed the population of citizens had spread across most of the peninsula. After a brief war 
(in which Rome had the worst of it for the most part), all Italians were admitted to citizenship 
and became members of the sovereign people.65 This massive expansion of the citizen body 
is less often cited in ancient and modern scholarship as a turning point than the Gracchan 
                                                     
62 Richardson, ‘The People and the State’ 2017 (n.29). 
63 Full discussion in Lintott, Andrew. Violence in Republican Rome. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 
1999). 
64 Plut. G. Gracch. 3. 
65 For the context, see Lomas, Kathryn. ‘Italy during the Roman Republic, 338-31 BC’. In The Cambridge 
Companion to the Roman Republic, ed. Harriet Flower (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 199-
224. 
moment, but surely must have had far wider implications.66 The new citizens had different 
interests from the old, whom they far outnumbered; but they were less able to exercise their 
new rights to participate.  
 
The expansion of the populus had wide-reaching effects, but in some ways it merely 
heightened an existing tension at the heart of Roman political culture. It had been a long time 
since Rome’s popular assemblies had truly represented full participatory democracy (if they 
ever had), since citizens living far afield or working to survive could not have attended to 
vote in person. Now, with the expansion of the franchise the gap between actual voters and 
the notional electorate became a gulf.  
 
Even after the expansion of the franchise, armed uprisings continued. In a period of twenty 
years, renegade generals including Lepidus, Sertorius, and even Spartacus – not to mention 
the civil war between Marians and Sullans – gathered large bands of citizen supporters who 
were willing to fight both for their economic interests (up to and including survival) and their 
political rights, which the dictatorship of Sulla in the late 80s BCE had decisively (if 
temporarily) curtailed.67 Valentina Arena has explored how one strand of Roman political 
rhetoric of the period defined these two demands as one and the same: in order to be truly 
free, the people needed both the economic means to survive, and the political power to 
manage their communal property, that is, the res publica.68 In practice, however, while all 
wished to be counted as members of the populus and share in Rome’s new prosperity, few 
                                                     
66 Important treatments include Nicolet, Claude. The World of the Citizen in Republican Rome (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1980), 17-47; Gabba, Emilio. Republican Rome, 1976 (n.59), 70-130. 
67 Provocative analysis in Rosenblitt, Alison. ‘The Turning Tide: The Politics of the Year 79 BCE’. 
Transactions of the American Philological Association 144 (2014), 415-44. 
68 Arena, Libertas (n.7). 
would have imagined turning up day after day to exercise their notional sovereignty by 
casting ballots. 
 
6. The changing populus 
 
The complex ideological relationship between the people and the populus (‘the People’ as an 
institution) had economic as well as political elements. All revenues belonged to the People, 
and the People could notionally at any time (and occasionally did) overrule the senate on any 
fiscal issue. Yet as Tan has shown, both the People and ordinary people increasingly lost their 
status as economic and political stakeholders even as their empire grew. I have tried to locate 
economic sovereignty away from Tan’s pragmatic model, but the political rhetoric and 
ideological manoeuvring I analyse had material effects that can be reconciled with the 
narrative he proposes.  
 
The ideal form of the populus Romanus, all adult male citizens drawn up in their divisions, 
could never convene in reality. In historical times, it was not coextensive with the army – 
especially as Italian allied troops did more and more of the fighting. Nor was it identical in 
anything but a rhetorical sense to the individuals who actually turned up to vote. The closest 
we might come to an actual instance of the populus, the institution in which the largest 
number of eligible citizens actually participated, may well indeed have been the pre-168 
tributum. After 91, the citizen body was multiplied many times over, now including many 
who had never paid tributum. Very few of them claimed their citizen rights to the grain dole, 
which was only distributed in person at Rome; if there was a single civic institution in which 
they all participated as citizens, it was the census, which recognised their economic status 
even though it was no longer the basis for reckoning tax contributions. 
 
Tan’s third- and second-century ‘people’ is defined as taxpayers; his first-century ‘people’ 
are recipients. Behind both looms the sovereign populus, who might be sovereign in the 
minimal sense that they are the ultimate referee between competing politicians, but are at 
least conceptualized as economically sovereign in the sense of the literal owners of Rome and 
everything in it. Between Tan’s first and second period, the end of tributum was not the only 
relevant change. I noted in the first section that the Gracchi and other tribunes began to insist 
on popular sovereignty over a broader spectrum of decision-making; beyond that, the 
citizenry had massively increased. Both changes affected the relationship between the 
populus and the economy, though in different ways: new debates around popular sovereignty 
reinforced the identity of populus and state, and the notional right of the people to manage 
their own property. At the same time, however, the expansion of citizenship turned the 
populus into an impossible abstraction. 
 
Over the course of the two and a half centuries this article has covered, the fiction by which 
the sovereignty of the populus was equated with the votes of a small number of real people at 
Rome became harder and harder to sustain. The citizenry was large, geographically scattered, 
and economically diverse: indeed, as Polybius shows, a subset of them were doing very well 
in the new economic landscape of imperialism. It does not necessarily follow that the populus 
was less cohesive: this is not a story about how Republican government only works for small, 
homogeneous populations. Rather, the fundamental relationship between the concrete 
citizenry and the abstract populus had shifted. For elites seeking to maximise the political and 
economic benefits of empire in their own interest, it became easier to separate the abstract 
populus from the ordinary voters standing in front of them, and to hail the ideal of popular 
sovereignty while in fact marginalizing the vast majority of real Romans.  
 
In the first section of this article, I identified a disconnect between political and economic 
readings of the late Republic. In political discourse, popular sovereignty is key; newer 
economic history, however, positions the people as both practically and theoretically 
marginalized. I have resisted any solution which separates ‘discourse’ and ‘reality’: claims of 
popular sovereignty, even if those speaking them meant them only as lip service, had material 
and economic effects. The urban and rural revolts that blighted the late Republic showed that 
ordinary Romans believed in and were willing to fight for their place in the political and 
economic system. Similarly, we cannot simply say that the two models are invoking two 
different ‘peoples’, assigning the abstract populus to the world of politics and the actual 
population to economic reality: my task is to investigate economic aspects of sovereignty, 
and both are relevant. Rather, I conclude that we cannot fully reconcile the two models 
precisely because Rome did face a crisis of economic sovereignty. The paradox is not of our 
making, but reflects an ancient disconnect. My contribution is to locate the problem not, or 
not only, in changing relationships between the people and the elite, or between people, elite, 
and state institutions, but in the changing nature of the populus itself.  Imperial expansion 
brought new administrative challenges and new sources of wealth, and Rome’s political and 
economic system was gradually adapting to both without challenging the technical 
sovereignty of the populus. But the population had also expanded, and fewer and fewer 
citizens participated directly in the institutions which embodied the populus. Different 
Romans had their own relationship to expansion and its revenues: some were contractors, 
some were soldiers, some lost everything. Appealing to the populus as sovereign, as literal 
owner of Rome’s empire, no longer satisfactorily expressed the relationship Rome’s 
population as a whole had with the economics of imperialism – not as a direct result of 




Ando, Clifford. Roman Social Imaginaries: Language and Thought in the Context of Empire 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2015). 
Arena, Valentina. Libertas and the Practice of Politics in the Late Roman Republic 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
Badian, Ernst. ‘Tiberius Gracchus and the Beginning of the Roman Revolution.’ Aufsteig und 
Niedergang der Römischen Welt I.1 (1972), 668-731 
Bernard, Seth. ‘Debt, Land, and Labor in the Early Republican Economy’. Phoenix 70 
(2016), 317-38. 
Bernard, Seth. Building Mid-Republican Rome: Labour, Architecture, and the Roman 
Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).  
Bleckmann, Bruno. 'Roman War Finances in the Age of the Punic Wars'. In Money and 
Power in the Roman Republic, edited by Hans Beck, Martin Jehne, and John Serrati 
(Brussels: Latomus, 2016), 82-96 
Champion, Craige, ed. Roman Imperialism: Readings and Sources (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
Coffee, Neil. Gift and Gain: How Money Transformed Ancient Rome (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2017). 
Cornell, Timothy. The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the 
Punic Wars (c. 1000-264 BC) (London; Routledge, 1995). 
Crawford, Michael H., ed. Roman Statutes (London: Institute of Classical Studies, University 
of London, 1996). 
Drummond, A. 'Rome in the Fifth Century Ii: The Citizen Community'. In The Cambridge 
Ancient History, edited by F. W. Walbank, A. E. Astin, M. W. Frederiksen, and R. M. 
Ogilvie, vol VII.2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 172-242. 
Eberle, Lisa. Land, Law, and Territories. The Roman Diaspora and the Making of Provincial 
Administration. PhD., Berkeley, 2014 
Erskine, Andrew. ‘Money-loving Romans’. Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar 9 
(1996), 1-11. 
Erdkamp, Paul. 'War and State Formation in the Roman Republic'. In A Companion to the 
Roman Army, edited by Paul Erdkamp (Chichester: Blackwell, 2007), 96-113. 
Flower, Harriet. Roman Republics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).  
Gabba, Emilio. Republican Rome:, the Army and the Allies (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1976). 
Garnsey, Peter and Dominic Rathbone, ‘The Background to the Grain Law of Gaius 
Gracchus’. Journal of Roman Studies 75 (1985), 20-25. 
Hammer, Dean. Were the People Sovereign in the Roman Republic? Working paper, 
retrieved from www.polisci.ucla.edu/sites/default/files/u20/5-20-2015_political-theory-
workshop-dean-hammer.pdf, 2015. 
Hoekstra, Kinch. 'Athenian Democracy and Popular Tyranny'. In Popular Sovereignty in 
Historical Perspective, edited by R Bourke and Q Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), 15-51. 
Hölkeskamp, Karl-Joachim. Reconstructing the Roman Republic: An Ancient Political 
Culture and Modern Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
Hölkeskamp, Karl-Joachim. 'Friends, Romans, Countrymen: Addressing the Roman People 
and the Rhetoric of Inclusion'. In Community and Communication: Oratory and 
Politics in Republican Rome, edited by Catherine Steel and Henriette van der Blom 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 11-28. 
Hopkins, Keith. Death and Renewal. Sociological Studies in Roman History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
Jehne, Martin, ed. Demokratie in Rom? Die Rolle Des Volkes in Der Politik Der Römischen 
Republik, Historia Einzelschriften 96 (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1995). 
Kay, Philip. Rome's Economic Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
Lintott, Andrew. Violence in Republican Rome (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 
1999). 
Lomas, Kathryn. ‘Italy during the Roman Republic, 338-31 BC’. In The Cambridge 
Companion to the Roman Republic, ed. Harriet Flower (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 199-224. 
Malmendier, Ulrike. Societas Publicanorum (Cologne: Böhlau, 2002). 
Millar, Fergus. 'The Political Character of the Classical Roman Republic, 200-151 BC'. 
Journal of Roman Studies 74 (1984): 1-19. 
Millar, Fergus. 'Politics, Persuasion and the People before the Social War (150-90 BC)'. 
Journal of Roman Studies 76 (1986): 1-11. 
Millar, Fergus. 'Political Power in Mid-Republican Rome : Curia or Comitium?'. Journal of 
Roman Studies 79 (1989): 138-50. 
Millar, Fergus. The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic. Jerome Lectures 22 (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1998). 
Moatti, Claudia. Res Publica. Histoire Romaine De La Chose Publique (Paris: Fayard, 
2018). 
Moatti, Claudia. ‘Res Publica, Forma Rei Publicae, and SPQR.” Bulletin of the Institute of 
Classical Studies 60 (2017): 34-48. 
Momigliano, Arnaldo. ‘The Origins of the Roman Republic.’ In Interpretation: Theory and 
Practice, ed. C. S. Singleton (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969), 1-
34. 
Morstein-Marx, Robert. ''Cultural Hegemony' and the Communicative Power of the Roman 
Elite'. In Community and Communication: Oratory and Politics in Republican Rome, 
edited by Catherine Steel and Henriette van der Blom (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 29-47. 
Nicolet, Claude. The World of the Citizen in Republican Rome (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1980), 17-47. 
Nicolet, Claude. Tributum (Bonn: Habelt, 1976). 
Nippel, Wilfried. Ancient and Modern Democracy: Two Concepts of Liberty? (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
North, John. 'Democratic Politics in Republican Rome'. Past and Present 126 (1990): 3-21. 
North, John. ‘The Constitution of the Roman Republic’. In A Companion to the Roman 
Republic, eds. Nathan Rosenstein and Robert Morstein-Marx (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2005), 256-77. 
Östenberg, Ida. Staging the World: Spoils, Captives, and Representations in the Roman 
Triumphal Procession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
Raaflaub, Kurt (ed.) Social Struggles in Archaic Rome: New Perspectives on the Conflict of 
the Orders (Malden, MA; Blackwell, 2nd edn, 2005). 
Richardson, James H. 'The People and the State in Early Rome'. In The Citizen, Past and 
Present, edited by A. Brown and J. Griffiths (Auckland: Massey, 2017), 63-91. 
Robb, Margaret. Beyond Populares and Optimates: Political Language in the Late Republic 
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2010). 
Rosenblitt, Alison. ‘The Turning Tide: The Politics of the Year 79 BCE’. Transactions of the 
American Philological Association 144 (2014), 415-44. 
Rosenstein, Nathan. ‘Bellum se ipsum alet? Financing Mid-Republican Imperialism’. In 
Money and Power in the Roman Republic, eds. Hans Beck, Martin Jehne, and John 
Serrati (Brussels: Latomus, 2016), 114-30 
Russell, Amy. The Politics of Public Space in Republican Rome (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016). 
Russell, Amy. ‘The Tribunate of the Plebs as a Magistracy of Crisis’. In Deformations and 
Crises of Ancient Civil Communities, eds. Valerij Goušchin and P.J. Rhodes 
(Stuttgart: Steiner, 2015), 127-39. 
Russell, Amy. ‘The Populus Romanus and the Rule of Law’. In The Rule of Law in Ancient 
Rome, eds. Elly Cowan et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
Santangelo, Federico. ‘A Survey of Recent Scholarship on the Age of the Gracchi’. Topoi 15 
(2007), 465-510. 
Scheidel, Walter. 'Approaching the Roman Economy'. In The Cambridge Companion to the 
Roman Economy, edited by Walter Scheidel (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 1-21. 
Smith, Christopher J. The Roman Clan: The Gens from Ancient Ideology to Modern 
Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
Straumann, Benjamin. Crisis and Constitutionalism: Roman Political Thought from the Fall of 
the Republic to the Age of Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
Tan, James. Power and Public Finance at Rome, 264-49 BCE (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2017). 
Taylor, Lily Ross. ‘Forerunners of the Gracchi’. Journal of Roman Studies 52 (1962), 19-27. 
Taylor, Lily Ross. Roman Voting Assemblies: From the Hannibalic War to the Dictatorship of 
Caesar (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966). 
Terrenato, Nicola and Donald C. Haggis, eds. State Formation in Italy and Greece: 
Questioning the Neo-Evolutionist Paradigm (Oxford: Oxbow, 2011). 
Vivenza, Gloria. 'Roman Economic Thought'. In The Cambridge Companion to the Roman 
Economy, edited by W Scheidel (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 25-44. 
Williamson, Callie. The Laws of the Roman People: Public Law in the Expansion and 
Decline of the Roman Republic (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005). 
Wirszubski, Chaim. Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome During the Late Republic and Early 
Principate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950). 
Zarecki, Jonathan. Cicero's Ideal Statesman in Theory and Practice (London: Bloomsbury, 
2014). 
 
 
